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Issues in Gravitational Wave Data Analysis
Lee Samuel Finn
Physics and Astronomy, Northwestern University, Evanston IL 60208-3112, USA
Data analysis is the application of probability and statistics to draw inference
from observation. Is a signal present or absent? Is the source an inspiraling binary
system or a supernova? At what point in the sky is the radiation incident from?
In these notes I want to address how two different statistical methodologies —
Bayesian and Frequentist — approach the problem of statistical inference.
1 Introduction
There is a perception that Bayesian and Frequentist statistical methodologies
are, at root, identical; that attempts to distinguish between them are sophistry;
that, even if there are differences, they are only semantic and without any
operational consequence.
These are all serious misconceptions. Bayesian and Frequentist statistical
methodologies are inequivalent; they ask fundamentally different questions of
the data in an attempt to draw inferences; and, because they ask different
questions, the analyses undertaken are quantitatively and qualitatively differ-
ent and lead to conclusions different in type and kind, even when regarding
the same data set.
In §2 and §3 we pose the question “with what confidence can we con-
clude that, in the last hour, the gravitational waves from a new core collapse
supernova in the Virgo cluster of galaxies passed through our gravitational
wave detector?” In §2 we consider the question from a Bayesian perspective,
while in §3 we consider it from a Frequentist perspective. We will find that
this apparently straightforward question takes on a different meaning to the
Frequentist and the Bayesian, leading each to respond in different ways.
Finally, in §4 we examine an example of a multi-detector data analysis
problem — the detection of a stochastic gravitational wave signal in two de-
tectors. A Frequentist analysis of this problem has been developed1,2,3,4 and is
summarized first.a In the following subsection we explore a Bayesian analysis
of the same problem 5, which leads to an analysis that is entirely unlike the
Frequentist one. Together, the discussion in §§2–4 demonstrates the very real,
operational differences between the Bayesian and Frequentist approaches to
data analysis.
aSee also Allen’s contribution to this proceedings.
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2 Learning From Observation: Bayesian Data Analysis
With what confidence can we conclude that, in the last hour, the gravitational
waves from a new core collapse supernova in the Virgo cluster of galaxies passed
through our gravitational wave detector?
We don’t approach this, or any other question, without some prior expecta-
tions. In this case, before examining the observations, our prior understanding
of astrophysics leads us to expect, on average, one such core collapse every 4
months; consequently, we believe the probability is approximately 3.4 × 10−4
that in any given hour — including the last — gravitational waves from a new
Virgo cluster supernova were incident on our detector.
Probability, as we have used it here, means degree of belief. In this instance,
our degree of belief coincided with the expected frequency of supernova events;
however, this need not be the case: we can assess degree of belief even when
we can’t assess relative frequency. For example, suppose that I have a coin
that is known to be heavily biased toward either heads or tails. What is your
degree of belief that, when I next flip the coin, it will land heads-up? Without
telling you the direction of the bias, you can’t evaluate the expected relative
frequency of heads or tails. You can, however, quantify your degree of belief:
having no more reason to believe that the bias is toward heads than towards
tails, you have no more reason to believe that the coin will, when next flipped,
land heads-up than that it will land heads-down. Your degree of belief in either
alternative, then, is 1/2.
One does not have to search either long or hard to find examples from
astrophysics where probability as “degree of belief” exists and probability as
“expected frequency” does not. For example, what is the probability that
there exists a cosmological stochastic gravitational wave signal with a given
amplitude and spectrum? In this case, “expected frequency” has no meaning:
there is only one Universe, and it either does or does not have a stochastic
gravitational wave background of given spectrum and amplitude.
After we examine the output of our gravitational-wave detector, our degree
of belief in the supernova proposition may change: we may, on the basis of the
observations, become more or less certain that radiation from a supernova
passed through our detector. How do observations change our degree of belief
in the different alternatives?
To explore how our degree of belief evolves with the examination of obser-
vations we need to introduce some notation:
H0 =

 proposition that gravitational waves from anew supernova in the Virgo cluster did not
pass through our detector in the last hour

 , (1)
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I =
(
our prior knowledge of astrophysics, including
our best assessment of the supernova rate
)
, (2)
g =
(
observations from our gravitational wave detector
)
, (3)
P (A|B) =
(
degree of belief in A assuming that B is true
)
, (4)
¬A = (logical negation of proposition A) . (5)
In this notation, P (H0|I) is the degree of belief we ascribe to the proposition
that no gravitational waves from a core collapse supernova in the Virgo cluster
passed through our detector in the last hour, given only our prior understand-
ing of astrophysics; similarly, P (H0|g, I) is the degree of belief we ascribe to
the same proposition, give both the observations g and our prior understanding
of astrophysics.
To understand how P (H0|I) and P (H0|g, I) are related to each other we
need to recall two properties of probability. The first is unitarity: probabil-
ity summed over all alternatives is equal to one. In our example, the two
alternatives are, given the observation g, a supernova occurred or it did not:
P (H0|g, I) + P (¬H0|g, I) = 1. (6)
The second property we need to recall is Bayes Law, which describes how
conditional probabilities “factor”:
P (A|B,C)P (B|C) = P (A,B|C) = P (B|A,C)P (A|C). (7)
Combining unitarity and Bayes Law it is straightforward to show that
P (¬H0|g, I) =
Λ(g)
Λ(g) + P (H0|I)/P (¬H0|I)
(8)
where
Λ(g) = P (g|¬H0, I)/P (g|H0, I) (9)
P (g|H0, I) =
(
probability that g is a sample of
detector output when H0 is true
)
(10)
P (g|¬H0, I) =
(
probability that g is a sample of
detector output when H0 is false
)
(11)
The two probabilities P (g|H0, I) and P (g|¬H0, I) depend on the statis-
tical properties of the detector noise and the detector response to the grav-
itational wave signal. In some cases they can be calculated analytically; in
other circumstances it may be necessary to evaluate them using, e.g., Monte
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Carlo numerical methods. Regardless of how one approaches data analysis
— as a Bayesian or as a Frequentist — the detector must be sufficiently well
characterized that these or equivalent quantities are calculable.
Equation 8 describes how our degree of belief in the proposition ¬H0
evolves as we review the observations. If Λ is large compared to the ratio
P (H0|I)/P (¬H0|I) then our confidence in ¬H0 increases; alternatively, if it is
small, then our confidence in ¬H0 decreases. If Λ is equal to unity — i.e., the
observation g is equally likely given H0 or ¬H0 — then the posterior proba-
bility P (H0|g, I) is equal to the prior probability P (H0|I) and our degree of
belief in H0 is unchanged: we learn nothing from the observation.
More complex hypotheses are analyzed in the same way: if
H0 = (no signal was incident on the detector during the last hour)(12)
Hθ =
(
the signal described by θ was incident
on the detector during the last hour
)
, (13)
where θ is some non-zero set of parameters, exhaust all possible alternative
states of nature, then
P (θ|g, I) =
Λ(g|θ)
Λ + P (H0|I)/P (¬H0|I)
P (θ|¬H0I) (14)
where
Λ(g|θ) = P (g|Hθ, I)/P (g|H0, I) (15)
Λ(g) =
∫
dnθΛ(g|Hθ, I)P (θ|¬H0, I) (16)
P (¬H0|I) = 1− P (H0|I). (17)
The alternative hypotheses represented by θ may represent the radiation from
different sources (e.g., supernovae, inspiraling compact binaries, stochastic sig-
nal, etc.), different numbers of sources (radiation from more than one example
of a source, or from more than one kind of source), or details about the par-
ticular sources (signal amplitude, source sky position, inspiraling binary chirp
mass, etc.).
We can now answer the question that began this section. As Bayesians,
we understand confidence to mean degree of belief in the proposition that
radiation originating from a new supernova in the Virgo cluster was incident
on a particular detector during a particular hour. In response we calculate
a quantitative assessment of our degree of belief in that proposition — the
probability that the proposition is true.
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3 Guessing Natures State: Frequentist Data Analysis
With what confidence can we conclude that, in the last hour, the gravitational
waves from a new core collapse supernova in the Virgo cluster of galaxies passed
through our gravitational wave detector?
As before, we have the hypothesis H0 and its logical negation, ¬H0. The
gravitational waves from a new Virgo cluster supernova either passed through
our detector, or they did not. Our goal is to determine, as best we can, which
of these two alternatives correctly describes what happened.
We decide which alternative is correct by consulting our observation g.
Operationally, we adopt a rule or a procedure that, when applied to g, leads
us to accept or reject H0. The question that began this section asks us to
determine the most reliable rule or procedure.
There are many procedures that we can choose from. Some are silly: for
example, always rejecting H0 is a procedure. Similarly, accepting H0 if a coin
flip comes-up heads is a procedure. Some procedures are more sensible: we can
calculate a characteristic amplitude from the observation (e.g., a signal-to-noise
ratio) and rejectH0 if the amplitude exceeds a threshold. Nature doesn’t speak
clearly and, often, some crucial information is hidden from us; so, no procedure
will, in the end, be perfect and every rule will, on unpredictable occasions,
lead us to erroneous conclusions. Still, some procedures are clearly better than
others: the question is, how do we distinguish between them quantitatively?
Better procedures are those that are less likely to be in error; consequently,
we focus on the error rate of different procedures. For our simple problem,
where we want to decide only if we have or have not observed the radiation
from a supernova (reject or accept H0), there are two kinds of errors a decision
procedure can make:
1. If no radiation is present (H0 true), the rule may incorrectly lead us to
conclude that radiation is present: a false alarm, or type I, error.
2. If radiation is present (H0 false), the rule may incorrectly lead us to
conclude that radiation is absent: a false dismissal, or type II, error.
The false alarm rate is generally denoted α while the false dismissal rate is
denoted β.b
The false alarm and false dismissal rates are frequency probabilities. If
we have an ensemble of identical detectors simultaneously observing the same
bWhen we have a more complex set of hypotheses — for example, when we are asked to choose
between the set of alternative hypotheses H0 and Hθ (cf. eq. 13) — there are additional
measures of error: e.g., the difference between the mean of the estimate of θ and its actual
value, or the variance of the estimates, etc.
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system for which H0 (or ¬H0) is true, and we apply our rule to each obser-
vation, then the limiting error rate is given by the false alarm (or dismissal)
rate. When, in the last section, we wore our Bayesian hat, we understood
probability to mean degree of belief; now, however, we understand probability
to mean limiting frequency of repeatable events. The distinction in meaning is
associated with the distinctly different interpretations of the question posed at
the beginning of this and the last section.
We have seen that, even in the simple case at hand (a single hypothesis
that we must accept or reject), there are at least two distinct kinds of errors
that an inference procedure can make. Our measure of a rule’s reliability thus
involves at least two dimensions, and may involve more. How, then, do we
order the rules to settle upon a best, or optimal, rule?
To rank rules we must reduce the several error measures that describe
a procedure’s performance to a single figure of merit. How we choose to do
this depends on the nature of our problem. In our case, rules that distinguish
between H0 and ¬H0 are characterized by their false alarm and false dismissal
rates; consequently, our criteria for ranking rules should depend on relative
intolerance to false alarms and false dismissals. For example, if we are testing
for the presence of antibodies in an effort to diagnose and treat a serious illness,
we might be very concerned to keep the false dismissal rate low, and not nearly
as worried about a high false alarm rate: after all, a false dismissal might result
in death, while a false alarm only in an unnecessary treatment with less serious
repercussions. Judges or juries in criminal trials faces different concerns: false
dismissals let criminals go free, while false alarms send the innocent to prison—
neither alternative being very palatable. Finally, in the case of gravitational
wave detection, we may (at least initially) be very concerned to avoid false
alarms, even at the risk of falsely dismissing many real signals.
Thus, in order to provide a relative ranking of different inference proce-
dures for detection or parameter estimation we must construct an ad hoc figure
of merit reflecting the particular nature of the decision to be made. We term
the best rule, under that ad hoc criteria, the “optimal” rule. “Optimality”,
however, is a relative concept: if the criteria change, the “optimal” rule changes
also. In the three examples given above, the criteria might be
• medical diagnosis: fix a maximum acceptable false dismissal rate and
choose the rule that, among all rules whose false dismissal rate is so
constrained, has the minimum false alarm rate;
• criminal justice: choose a rule whose weighted total error α cosφ+β sinφ
is minimized (φ being a matter of personal choice for an individual judge
or juror);
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• gravitational wave detection: fix a maximum acceptable false alarm rate
and choose the rule that, among all rules whose false alarm rate is so
constrained, has the minimum false dismissal rate.
False alarm and dismissal rates describe our confidence in the long-run
behavior of the associated decision rule. To understand the implications of
this measure of confidence, suppose that we have not one, but N independent
and identical detectors all observing during the same hour. We use the same
test, with false alarm rate α and false dismissal rate β, on the observations
made at each detector, and find that, of these N observations, m lead us
(through our inference rule) to reject H0 and N −m lead us to accept H0. For
a concrete example, suppose α is 1%, N is ten and m is three.
The probability of obtaining this outcome when the signal is absent (H0
is true) is the probability of obtaining m false alarms in N trials, or
P (m|H0, N) =
N !
(N −m)!m!
αm(1− α)N−m. (18)
In our example, P (m|H0, N) evaluates to 1.1 × 10
−4. It is thus very unlikely
that we would have made this observation if the signal were absent. Does this
mean we should conclude the signal is present with, say, 99.99% confidence?
No. P (m|H0, N) describes the probability of observing m false alarms out
of N observations. When the signal is present, however (i.e., when H0 is false),
there are no false alarms and both α and P (m|H0, N) are irrelevant. There are,
however, N −m false dismissals; thus, the relevant quantity is P (m|¬H0, N),
the probability of observing N −m false dismissals:
P (m|¬H0, N) =
N !
(N −m)!m!
(1− β)mβN−m. (19)
If, in our example, the false dismissal rate β is 10%, then the probability of
observing seven false dismissals out of ten trials is is 8.7× 10−5.
The particular outcome of our example — three positive results out of ten
trials — may be, overall, unlikely; however, it is more unlikely to have occurred
when the signal is present then when it is absent. Despite the apparently
overwhelming improbability of three false alarms in ten trials, it is nevertheless,
slightly more likely than the alternative of seven false dismissals in ten trials.
We can now answer the question that began this section. As Frequen-
tists, we understand the question to ask for the overall error rates of the best
general procedure for deciding between the alternative hypotheses. We thus
calculate the error rates for different inference rules, choose appropriate crite-
ria for ranking the different rules, and find the best rule and its corresponding
error rates.
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Contrast this with our understanding of the identically worded question
posed to us as Bayesians. As Bayesians, we understood confidence to mean
the degree of belief that we should ascribe to alternative hypotheses; as Fre-
quentists, we understand confidence to refer to the overall reliability of our
inference procedure. As Bayesians we responded with a quantitative assess-
ment of our degree of belief in the alternative hypotheses, given a particular
observation made in a particular detector over a particular period of time; as
Frequentists, we responded with an assessment of the relative frequency with
which our rule errs given each alternative hypothesis. As Bayesians, we did not
make a choice between alternative hypotheses; rather, we rated them as more
or less likely to be true in the face of a particular observation. As Frequentists,
on the other hand, we do make choices and our concern is with the error rate
of our procedure for choosing, averaged over many different observations and
many different decisions.
Frequentist analyses have particular utility when it is possible to make
repeated observations on identical systems: e.g., particle collisions in an accel-
erator, where each interaction of particle bunches is an “experiment.” Bayesian
analyses, on the other hand, are particularly appropriate when the observations
or experiments are non-repeatable: e.g., when the sources are, like supernovae,
non-identical and destroy themselves in the process of creating the signal. In
the latter case, we are generally particularly interested in the properties of
the individual systems and would prefer a measure of the relative degree of
belief that we should ascribe to, for example, the proposition that the signal
originated from different points in the sky.
4 Example: Data Analysis for Stochastic Signals
As an example of how Bayesian and Frequentist statistical methodologies
lead to quantitatively different analyses, consider how one might search for
a stochastic gravitational wave signal, making use of observations in a pair of
gravitational wave detectors. Over the last several years a Frequentist analysis
of this problem has been developed 1,2,3,4. In §4.1 I outline that analysis (see
also Allen’s contribution to these proceedings). In §4.2 I outline an alternative,
Bayesian analysis of the same problem 5.
4.1 A Frequentist approach
Very briefly, the Frequentist analysis developed in the literature 1,2,3,4 begins
with the observation that a stochastic signal will lead to a correlated response
in the output of physically distinct detectors, while instrument noise in the
same detectors is likely to be largely uncorrelated. This observation leads us
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to consider Frequentist decision rules based on a correlation of the output of
several detectors. Focus attention on two detectors, whose discretely sampled
output over the interval [0, T ) are given by the sequences h1[k] and h2[k], with
k running from 0 to NT − 1. Focus attention on the generalized correlation
µQ(h1, h2) =
NT∑
k
NT∑
j
h1[k]Q[k − j]h2[j]. (20)
The coefficients Q[k − j] are, for now, arbitrary.
If no signal is present, then the distribution of µQ depends on the statis-
tical properties of the detector noise; for instance, if the noise is uncorrelated
between the detectors, then µQ will have vanishing mean. If the signal is
present, the distribution of µQ depends on statistical properties of both the
noise and the stochastic signal and will, in general, be different from the case
of no signal because the signal leads to a correlation in the output of the two
detectors. Let σ2Q be the variance of µQ in the absence of a signal, i.e.,
σ2Q ≡ µ
2
Q (21)
where the average is over different instantiations of the random detector out-
puts when these are detector noise alone. Define also the signal-to-noise ratio
ρQ:
ρQ(h1, h2) ≡ µQ(h1, h2)/σQ. (22)
If no signal is present and the noise in the two detectors is uncorrelated, ρQ
will, averaged over many trials, vanish. On the other hand, if there is a signal
present then ρQ will, over many trials, have a non-zero average value which
is proportional to the signal strength and independent of the normalization of
Q. A Frequentist decision rule is to fix Q and evaluate ρQ, deciding that a
signal is present if ρQ exceeds a fixed threshold. The amplitude of µQ will,
on average and for sufficiently large signal amplitudes, be proportional to the
squared signal amplitude.
The freedom in the choice of Q can be used to tune the test. Suppose
that the spectrum of the stochastic signal is known up to a constant, unknown
amplitude. Assume that, for fixed non-zero signal strength, better tests give
larger ρQ; then, knowing the statistical properties of the signal and the noise we
can maximize ρQ over the coefficientsQ to find the “best” test of the form given
in equation 20 (best in this case meaning the test that gives greatest signal-
to-noise for fixed signal). Since ρQ is proportional to the signal amplitude, if
we decide that a signal is present, ρQ also provides an estimate of the signal
amplitude.
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4.2 A Bayesian approach
Observations enter Bayesian analyses through the likelihood function (cf. eq. 15).
Regard the discretely sampled detector outputs h1[k] and h2[k] as components
of h[k], the vector-valued output of a gravitational wave receiver consisting
of two detectors. Assume for simplicity that the noise and signal both have
Gaussian-stationary statistics (this is the case for the usual stochastic signals
considered and is also assumed in the Frequentist analyses to date 2,3,4). The
statistical properties of the receiver noise n[k] are then characterized fully by
the sequence of noise correlation matrices C[k]:
C[j − k] = n[j]⊗ n[k] (23)
||C[j − k]|| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n1[j]n1[k] n1[j]n2[k]
n2[j]n1[k] n2[j]n2[k]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (24)
The probability that an observation h is a sample of receiver noise is a multi-
variate Gaussian,
P (h|0) = exp (−〈h,h〉
C
) /2pi
√
det ||C|| (25)
〈h,h〉
C
=
1
2
NT∑
j,k
h[j] · ||C||
−1
jk · h[k], (26)
where the covariance matrix ||C||−1 is the inverse of the 2(2NT−1)×2(2NT−1)
block matrix ||C|| composed from the sequence C[k]: ||C||jk = ||C[j − k]||.
In the presence of a Gaussian-stationary stochastic signal the receiver out-
put remains Gaussian-stationary; however, the covariance changes. The new
covariance K depends on the auto-correlation of the receiver noise C and the
auto-correlation of the receiver response to the stochastic signal S(θ), which
is characterized by θ. Thus, the probability that observed receiver output h is
a sample of noise plus signal is
P (h|θ) = exp
(
−〈h,h〉
K(θ)
)
/2pi
√
det ||K(θ)|| (27)
K(θ) = C+ S(θ). (28)
The likelihood function is the ratio of P (h|θ, I) to P (h|0, I), or
Λ(h|θ) =
√
det ||C||
det ||K(θ)||
exp (〈h,h〉
C
)
exp
(
〈h,h〉
K(θ)
) (29)
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The optimal test described in §4.1 is based on the test statistic ρ, which is
ρQ (cf. eq. 22) with Q chosen to give the largest possible average value for ρQ in
the presence of a signal. This statistic is, by construction, linear in the output
of each of the two detectors. The likelihood function, on the other hand, has a
more complex dependence on the detector outputs; in particular, Λ(g|θ) is not
a function of the test statistic ρ. As a result, conclusions reached through the
Frequentist test summarized in §4.1 will be quantitatively different than those
reached in a Bayesian analysis.
A difference does not imply that one analysis is right and the other wrong.
As we have seen, Bayesian and Frequentist analyses do not address the same
questions; so, they are not required to reach “identical” conclusions. On the
other hand, it may well be that one analysis is more appropriate or responsive
to our concerns than the other. We can only make the choice of appropriate
analysis tool when we understand the distinction between them.
5 Conclusions
Bayesian data analyses address how observations affect our degree of belief in
propositions about nature: for example, in the proposition that radiation orig-
inating from a new supernova in the Virgo cluster was incident on a particular
gravitational wave detector during a particular hour. The result of a Bayesian
analysis is a quantitative measure of our degree of belief in the proposition in
the face of an observation — the probability that the proposition is true.
Frequentist data analyses address our confidence in a general procedure
for deciding, e.g., whether a signal is present or absent. Frequentists do not
assess degree of belief or confidence in any particular conclusion; rather they
assess confidence in the procedure used for reaching conclusions. The result
of a Frequentist analysis is a conclusion about the state of nature, made by
a carefully chosen rule, upon examination of the data. Confidence in that
conclusion is an assessment of the rule’s average performance: if one were to
observe the same source in the same detector many times, how frequently, or
by what average amount, would our procedure for deciding err?
In a Frequentist analysis, confidence is the reliability of a procedure; in
a Bayesian analysis, it is the degree of belief ascribed to a hypothesis. Since
astrophysical events that generate gravitational waves tend to be unique, grav-
itational wave data analysis that focuses on the properties of individual sources
should be Bayesian. When studying individual sources we are very interested
in quantifying our uncertainty (in, e.g., the source chirp mass) given the only
observations we have. We are generally not interested in knowing how well
some procedure might do in estimating, e.g., the chirp mass if we could ob-
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serve the same source many times. We only get one look at most sources
— stochastic background and periodic sources being the exceptions — and
Bayesian techniques are more suited to the study of individual sources.
Even in the case of stochastic and periodic signals, Bayesian analyses ad-
dress questions closer to our immediate interests. Given a long enough obser-
vation, Frequentist and Bayesian analyses converge to equivalent conclusions:
in the Bayesian analysis, the long observation leads us to increasingly narrow
the degree of our uncertainty, while in a Frequentist analysis, the long series
of observations leads to a series of conclusions (from repeated application of
our inference rule) whose distribution will be consistent with only one possi-
ble hypothesis about nature. In the Bayesian analysis, however, we know at
any point along the way what our degree of uncertainty is, while in the Fre-
quentist analysis our conclusions are not about our degree of uncertainty (in,
e.g., the presence or absence of a signal) but about how likely it is that one
can distinguish between the alternatives (e.g., signal absent/present, or signal
amplitude) given the number of different observations made up to that point.
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